














Intuitively, we associate different political parties with different types of policy.
In contrast, this paper shows that in the absence of differential coats of inembership
among parties (that is, if party membership is cheap talk), party labels cannot
perfectly signal the ideologies of candidates. Rowever, under certain conditions
partios ~~an signal candidale lypiw imperfectly. The paper therefore also provides
an example of how coatless communication can be effective in games ot paztial
conflict.
1 Introduction
Does knowing the party a political candidate belongs to help predict the policies he would
be likely to implement if elected to an office? It is tempting to think the answer is an
obvious yes. We intuitively identify political parties with specific types of policy, or even
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ideologies.~ From the point of view of the voter, it seems the most important function of
parties is to be brand names.
}'erhaps because this seems so self-evident, standard textbooks of formal political
theory such as, for example, Mueller (8] and Ordeshook [9] contain no mention of any
theory of why there are different political paztiea and why they would want to signal
their differences. In fact, the classical Hotelling-Downa tradition, which treats parties
as motivationally identical firms, points in the opposite direction (aee Hotelling [6] and
Downs [3]). At least ií the distribution of voter preferencea ia single-peaked, the theory
Ieads us to expect parties to be very similar.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the intuition more cloaely. We shall assume
that caudidates and voters both have preferred policies. The policy position (or ideology)
of a candidate or voter will be termed its type. In particular, if candidates could costlessly
signal their types to voters, we shall ask if they ahould be expected to actually do so. It
seems plausible to assume that, ex ante, only voters care whether they elect candidates
of Lheir own type. Candidates are perhapa best thought of as primatily concerned with
getting elected, not with who elects them. A moment's consideration of these potentially
conflicting interests leads to the baseline result of this paper. If votera of a particular type
consistently support a specific party, candidates will not neceasazily want to associate
themselves with that party if there is another pazty that has more supportera. So in
general, political candidates would not want to perfectly reveal their policy type. The
intuitive theory that parties exist because political candidates wisó to signal their ideology
to voters is therefore almost certainly wrong.
We shall show, however, that there are (generic) circumstances under which pazties
can be meaningful brand names in a probabilistic sense, even if they cannot separate
candidate types perfectly.
'1'he issues discussed in this paper are related to studies of elections as games with
asymmetric information and costly signaling. (See, e g, Banks [1].) There are important
differences, however. In this paper, party labels are the only information votera have about
candidates. A more closely related work is that of Harrington (5], who discusses equilibria
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in elections where candidates can make costless policy announcements. I~arrington's work
is not concerned with explaining the rationale for policy-distinguished parties in the sense
of the present paper, however.
The model ofcandidates who can costlesaly label themselves and thus potentially signal
their ideological typc to voters is what is sometimes known as a ucheap talk" game~ with
private iníormation. (See Crawford and Sobel ~2] for an early discusaion of such games.)
Chrap talk may expand the set of equilibria that can be induced in the underlying game
as compared to the game without cheap talk. The case studied in thia paper is a simple
example of a game oí two-sided incomplete information, one-sided communication, and
con(lict of interest. As will be seen, under certain conditions cheap talk can be effective
and partially reveal information in this game. It is therefore alao an example of how cheap
talk can be informative in games of conflict of interest.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model informally and ahows
why perfect separation ca.nnot be an equilibrium. For simplicity, we study a situation
with only two types of candidate and voter. Section 3 looks deeper into the model and
shows that thcre may be partially separating equilibria, fulfilling a proposed list of criteria
intended to capture the intuitive notion of party separation. Finally, Section 4 notes some
issues not dealt with in the present model.
2 An Impossibility Theorem
We shall assume political candidates have their own preferred policies, in addition to the
desire to get elected. In general, both candidates and voters may have complete ayatems
of more fundamental beliefs from which they can generate a position on each specific iasue.
We can call such systems and the policy preferences they imply ideologies. An ideology
may be a point on a one-dimensional issue acale (e g, the level of defense expenditure), or
a set in a multi-dimensional policy space. The main point is that we shall not let adoption
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of a platform be the decision variable, as it is in the more common Hotelling-atyle modela
that view parties as competing firms. A candidate is assumed to implement the policies
associated with his type if he is elected to an of6ce.
Assume, for simplicity, that there are two types of ideology, H and L, that can be held
by both candidates and voters. Voters believe the proportion3 of candidatea of ideology H
is cH, and the proportion of candidatea of ideology L is c~ - 1- cy. Candidatea believe
the proportions of voters of the respective ideologies are vH and vL - 1- vy. In case the
policy space allows some natural ordering, the median voter is simply the type of voter
of which there is most.
We consider a situation where a voter is faced with a candidate. Think of this as, for
example, an approval voting procedure where a voter has to consider whether to approve
or not approve of each candidate in turn. Alternatively, thia is a model of aimple majority
voting, where a single candidate, ot a committee of candidates, will ultimately be elected.
We can then think of the situation under atudy as one where the voter determines a set of
candidates considered equally good, prior to selecting randomly from that set a particulat
candidate, or particular set of candidates, to vote for.
A candidate can choose to belong to one of two parties, R or D. The choice of pazty
either has no direct effect on the candidate's payoffs, or the cost is the same for both
parties. A voter can choose to support or not support a candidate. The voter observea
the party labels of candidates, but cannot obaerve their ideology directly. A voter faced
with a specific candidate prefers supporting a candidate of the same ideology to eupporting
a candidate of the other ideology, regardlesa of party labels. By this we mean that a voter
prefers the post-election policy implemented by a candidate of his own ideology type.
A candidate wishes to get as much support as posaible, regazdleas of party labels or
thc ideology of those who support him.
We use the sequential equiliórium solution concept of Kreps and Wilson [7]. Since in
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this rnodel, which has only one decision atage for each player, any voter beliefs off the
equilibrium path are consistent in the sense of sequential rationality, any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is sequential.
Without any additional assumptions on preferences, we can now state the following
impossibility result.
Proposition 1 Except when vH - vL, thene is no Nash equilébrium such that
1. all H candidates óelong to party x,
2. all L candidates óelong to party y~ x,
~. H voters always support x candidates and reject y candidates, and
4. L voters always support y candidates and neject x candidates.
PROOF. To see this, it suf6ces to study the case where x- R and y- D, since the party
labels have no special significance out of equilibrium. Note that the situation deacribed
in th~~ Proposition is compatible with voter rationality. An H candidate therefore geta
support vf~. Only if v~~ ~ vL is it rational for an II candidate to comply with the proposed
schr~me. An l, candidate gets support vL. Only i[ vL ? vy is it rational for an L candidate
t.o comply. Therefore this is only an equilibrium when v1f - vL. t7
At first sight, this might not seem so restrictive. After all, what ia required for parties
to function as perfect signals is only that candidates believe that both types of voter are
equally likely, i e, that candidates have no information about the ideological composition
of the constituency. However, such an equilibrium is very unstable to perturbations in
beliefs. Even a vague suspicion that there are more voters of one type than the other
is enough to destroy the equilibrium. In the following we shall therefore asaume that
t~H ~ vL.
3 Partially Separating Equilibria
The purpose of this section is to look for equilibria that, although they cannot be perfectly
revealing, have some of the intuitive properties we associate with partiea. As it turns out,6
undcr certaiu ainditions thcre are equilibria such that there are more of one type in one
party than in tlie other, and one type of voter ia more likely to support that party.
W~~ now look nwrc cloway at the decieion aituation facing thc playere. Votcrs can
choose to support (action S) or not support (action N) a particular candidate. Let s;(j)
be tlic probability that a voter of type i supporta a candidate of party j, and s;(x) the
probability that a candidate of type i asaumes the party label x. For example, sH(R) is the
prol,ability an I! voter assigns to anpporting an R candidatc, and s`q(It) the probability
that an H candidate assigns to belonging to party R.
A candidate of type i has the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function
u;(a), where a E {S, N} is the aupport decision of the voter. The expected utility of a type
i candidate who belongs to party x is then equal to vH(sy(x)u;(S)~-(1 -sy(x))u;(N))~
vL(si(x)u;(S)-~(1-s~(x))u;(N)). Thepreferencesofcandidatesarethereforecompletely
described by saying that they prefer more expected support to leas. A candidate is
indifferent between the two party labels if we have that
vH9y(R) f vL9L(R) - vH'H(D) f vL9L(D)- (1)
A voter of type i has the utility function u;(j,k) with the von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility property, where j E{S, N} is the support decision and k E {H, L} is the
type of candidate. These utilities are of course intended to refer to the expected effects
of the post-election policies implemented by a candidate who has received support. So a
voter of type H has payoffs as summarized in the following table.
Voter H actions
S N
Candidate types H uy(S, H) uN(N, H)
L uH(S,L) uH(N,L)
Naturally, we have that u"y(N,L) ~ uy(S,L) and uy(S,H) ~ uy(N,H).
The payoffs of a type L voter are summarized by the following table.
Voter L actions
S N
Candidate types H u~(S, H) u~(N, H)
L u~(S,L) uL(N,L)7




uH(S,, H) - uy(,S, L) f uy(~y, L) - uH(11r, H)'
The assumptions guarantee that xy E(0,1). The number ay is the probability of a given
candidate being oí type H that makes an H voter indifferent between supporting and not
supporting the candidate. Let P(H~x) be the probability that a candidate of party x is of
type H. Then an H voter will support all party x candidatea if P(HIx) 1 rry and reject
all party x candidates if P(H~x) G Ay.
Call a voter's mistaken decision to not support a candidate of the preferred ideology
a Typc 1 crror, and the decision to support a candidate of the wrong ideology a Type II
error. We can then think of rry as a measure of the relative regret associated with a
Type I! error for a type H voter.
Correspondingly, let
~L ~- uv S, L u~ S H u~ N, H u~ N, L- L( ) - L( , ) t L( ) - L( )
The assumptions guarantee that aL E (0,1). The number aL is the probability of a given
candidate beiug of type L that makes an L voter indifferent betwecn aupporting and not
supporting the candidate. It is also a measure of the relative regret from a Type II error.
Au L voter will support all party x candidates if P(L~x) 1 aL and reject all party x
candidates if P(L~x) G aL.
'I'hcrc is no a priori rcason to suppose that thc differcnt types of voters di(ier in thcir
relative evaluations of errors. Therefore, we shall assume that rry - aL - a E(0,1). 1'he
character of the results in no way depends on this assumption.
Define the open sets
A1 - ~(~eCH)I~ G Cy,ff i CL,Cy G 1},
AY - i(~,CH)IA i Cy,A i CL,7r G 1},
A3 - L(~,CH)I~ i Cy,7r G CL,CH ~ 0),
u~(N, H) - ui(S, H)
and
A4 - l(~,CH)I~ G Cy,A G CL,7r ~ O}.8
Figure 1 illustrates these sets, which cover "almost all" cases.
If there were no parties, or if all candidates belonged to the same party, then
1. in Al, H voters would support all candidates and L voters would reject all candi-
dates,
2. in Azi all voters would reject all candidates,
3. in A~, 11 voters would reject all candidates and L voters woiild support all candi-
dates, and
4. in A4i all voters would support all candidates.
In lieu of perfect separation, we now look for equilibria satisfying the following proposed
intuitive criteria of ineaningfulness of party labels.
Definition 1 Ari equilibrium is said to be a meaningful party equilibrium ij
1. P(L~x) 1 P(L~y) and P(H~y) 1 P(H~x) (there are more of one type in one party),
2. s~(x) 1 s~(y) and sy(y) 1 sH(x) (a voter is more likely to support the party that
has more oj his favorile type of candidate), and
:1. s~ (x) ,.v~~(r) aud s~~(y) 1 s~(y) (a votcr oj one lype is more ltkely to support his
javorite party than is a voter oj the other type).
We are now in a position to prove the following result, which states that if, in the absence of
party information, all voters would support all candidates, there are equilibria where party
labels reveal information about candidate ideologies in a sense satisfying the intuitive
criteria. Thus party labels can matter, even though they do not affect payoffs directly.




sy(x) - cy(1 - 2x),





sL(y) - I - vH,
where x, y E {R, D} and x~ y.
PROOF. To see this, note that in equilibrium we have that
cys`y(x)





cHSy(y) f cGSi(y) - ~'
so H voters are indifferent between supporting and not supporting x candidates, but will
want to support y candidates with probability 1(since if (A,cy) E.4~, then 1- x~ x).
G voters will want to support x candidates with probability 1 and are indifferent between
supporting and not supporting y candidates. Where they are indifferent, they might as
well choose the probabilities of support prescribed by the equilibrium. Then (1) holds,
so candidates are indifferent between parties and might as well choose them with the
probabilities prescribed by the equilibrium. That (x, cy) E A~ guaranteea that sH(x)
and sL(x) lie in the unit interval. It is easily seen that these equilibria exist only when
(~,cl~) E Aa. ~
Note that meaningful party equilibria exist only when conditions are such that in the
abs~ncc of any information apart from the population distribution of candidate types,
voti-rs would support all candidatc~s. 1'his means that meaning(ulness is only possiblc
when it hurts candidates, whose expected payoff ia less in an equilibrium with meaningful
parties than if there were no communication possibilities at all, whereas voters are better
oft. In coordination games with costless communication, informative equilibria typically
payoff-dominate the outcomes possible without the communication opportunity.lo
4 Remarks
The objective of this paper has been to inveatigate whether party affiliation can serve as
a means of signaling the policy types of candidates in a stazk setting where parties could
serve no other purpose. Political parties in the real world of course have various other
functions.
For instance, parties could enforce a particular policy line for its candidates. That is,
tliey could punish candidates who when elected reveal a policy type that deviatea from
the party line. Modelling this would take ua back to the Hotelling-Downs framework of
parties as firms, with policy platform as the decision variable. It would tell ua little about
the pure information value oí party labels.
Finally, real-world elections are repeated affairs, where the same votera face the same
candidates more than once. An interesting task for future research would be to investigate
whether repetition of the game in the present paper could generate equilibria in which
parties are informative in a larger set oí circumstances.
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